Silicon Valley has a China envy problem.

矽谷陷入了對中國的羨慕。

In social media posts, podcasts, interviews and newsletters, the elites of the American tech sector are marveling at China’s speed in building infrastructure, its manufacturing might and the ingenuity of the A.I. company DeepSeek. At the same time, they are lamenting aging infrastructure and cumbersome regulations in the United States, and an economy that can’t seem to make screws or drones, or the machines that manufacture them.

在社群媒體帖子、播客、採訪和時事通訊中，美國科技界精英對中國的基建建設速度、製造業實力以及人工智慧公司DeepSeek的創新能力讚嘆不已。與此同時，他們也在痛惜美國陳舊的基礎設施、繁瑣的監管體系，以及這個連螺絲釘、無人機乃至其生產設備都難以製造的經濟體。

Some have called for an American DeepSeek project, published industrial manifestoes full of references to China and even adopted China Tech’s grueling “996” work culture, 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. six days a week.

“As China races forward, moving goods, people and information at machine speed, we risk being stuck in the past,” a recent blog post from the venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz warned.

「當中國全速前進，以機械的速度運送貨物、人員和信息時，我們可能正被困在過去，」風險投資公司安德烈森·霍洛維茨近期在一篇部落格文章中警告。

Among Silicon Valley leaders and policy-minded Democrats, there is a fascination with China. It’s a mix of curiosity, anxiety and envy. Long-held assumptions about China are being re-evaluated.

在矽谷領袖和關注政策的民主黨人當中瀰漫著一種對中國的痴迷情緒，混雜著好奇、焦慮與羨慕。長期以來關於中國的固有認知正被重新評估。

Suddenly, Chinese firms once dismissed as copycats are being studied for lessons on efficiency and scale. China’s top-down, state-led system is being reframed not as a political liability but as a model of efficiency and execution.

曾被斥為抄襲者的中國企業如今突然成為研究效率與規模的典範；中國自上而下的國家主導體制也不再被視為政治上的不利因素，反而被重塑為高效執行的典範。

Both narratives — China as cheater and China as colossus — are simplistic reactions to something far more complex. Yet their popularity reveals something deeper about the American psyche as the nation struggles to adjust to a world where it is no longer the uncontested source of technological progress.

無論是將中國視為作弊者還是巨無霸，這兩種敘事都是對複雜現實的簡化反應。然而，它們的盛行揭示了美國人深層的心理狀態——當這個國家正艱難適應一個不再以自己為唯一技術進步來源的世界。

“For Americans, the idea that the future is now being created elsewhere — not in the United States — is a hard reality to accept,” said Afra Wang, a Silicon Valley-based tech writer. “This isn’t just about technology; it’s a question of identity.”

「對於美國精英來說，美國沒有創造未來，而是別的國家在創造未來，這個現實是很難接受的，」矽谷科技作家阿夫拉·王（音）表示。「這不僅僅關乎技術，更是一個身份認同問題。」

That identity crisis touches more than tech. It informs the views of so-called abundance Democrats frustrated by America’s inability to build housing or high-speed rail, as American tourists post social media videos of China’s bridges, trains and skylines.

這種身份認同危機不僅影響科技領域。當美國遊客在社群媒體上發布中國的橋樑、高鐵和城市天際線影片時，那些對美國無力建造住房和高鐵感到沮喪的所謂豐饒派民主黨人也受到了這種情緒的影響。

The new admiration for China highlights both how little Americans understand about the country and how disillusioned many have become with their own. By holding China up as a mirror, America is seeing its own strengths and weaknesses more clearly than it has in decades.

新近產生的對中國的崇拜既凸顯了美國人對這個國家的了解之少，也反映出許多人對本國的幻滅。將中國視為一面鏡子，美國比幾十年來任何時候都更清晰地看到了自身的優勢與劣勢。

Tech leaders are right to be alarmed. The old American model — we innovate, we build, we export — collapsed after the United States outsourced much of its manufacturing capacity. Now America mostly designs while China increasingly embodies that earlier American model of building and producing. In a tense geopolitical environment defined by supply chains, the ability to manufacture has become both strategic and existential.

科技領袖們的警惕並非毫無道理。美國舊有的「創新-製造-出口」模式在製造業大量外包後已然崩塌。如今，美國主要負責設計，中國則日益承接起昔日美國的「製造-生產」模式。在以供應鏈為核心的緊張地緣政治環境中，製造能力已成為兼具戰略意義與生存價值的關鍵能力。

The challenge goes beyond traditional manufacturing. Integrating artificial intelligence with hardware is essential. Machines today are “the hardware version of software; they are the embodied version of A.I.,” said Marc Andreessen, the venture capitalist. “The car is not just steel and glass anymore — it’s a robot on wheels.”

He concedes that China is “ahead on everything involved in building physical things,” and much more advanced in unified hardware and A.I. manufacturing.

他承認，中國在「所有實體製造相關領域都處於領先地位」，在硬件與人工智慧融合製造方面佔據巨大優勢。

It’s a positive sign that Silicon Valley is paying attention to China.

矽谷開始關注中國，這是一個積極的信號。

All along, Chinese entrepreneurs have spent decades studying the United States. They have read the biographies of Steve Jobs and Elon Musk, devoured the translations of “Zero to One,” the book by Peter Thiel and Blake Masters. They have built business models and management philosophies around Silicon Valley’s playbook.

中國企業家花了數十年時間研究美國：他們閱讀史提夫·賈伯斯和伊隆·馬斯克的傳記，潛心研讀彼得·蒂爾與布萊克·馬斯特斯合著的《從0到1》(Zero to One)譯本，並圍繞矽谷的運營模式構建商業模式和管理哲學。

American companies are racing to build machines more intelligent than humans. Yet if Silicon Valley studies China closely, it will find that China’s A.I. industry is not obsessed with artificial general intelligence, or A.G.I. Chinese entrepreneurs are focused on applying A.I. to services, devices and manufacturing.

美國公司正爭相研發比人類更智能的機器。然而，若矽谷深入研究中國，就會發現，中國的人工智慧產業並不痴迷於通用人工智慧，中國企業家更專注於將人工智慧應用於服務、設備和製造業領域。

I talk to a lot of people who work in the tech industry in China. Rarely do they mention A.G.I.

我與許多中國科技行業從業者交流過，他們很少提及通用人工智慧。

In an opinion essay in The New York Times, Eric Schmidt, the former Google chairman, and his colleague Selina Xu urged Silicon Valley to be less obsessed with A.G.I. and to learn from their Chinese peers to help integrate A.I. into daily life.

This is yet another example of China’s pragmatism versus America’s idealism.

這正是中國實用主義對陣美國理想主義的又一例證。

American policymakers and Silicon Valley need to assess China and its tech sector realistically — its strengths and limits and what truly lies behind its efficiency and scale. China’s tech scene, like America’s, has visionaries and frauds, triumphs and dead ends.

美國政策制定者和矽谷需要客觀評估中國及其科技行業——包括其優勢與局限，以及其效率與規模背後的真正原因。與美國一樣，中國的科技領域既有遠見卓識者，也有騙子；既有輝煌成就，也有死胡同。

The current narrative risks swinging from underestimation to overestimation.

當前的敘事存在從低估走向高估的風險。

Part of the reason American tech leaders amplify China’s capabilities, or its threat, is to pressure Washington into squeezing their Chinese peers with tariffs and regulation, and to win federal funding. By framing China’s rise as an existential challenge, they can push the government to pour money into their industries. The more they can alarm U.S. politicians and the public, the greater their leverage, and the more power they ultimately gain.

美國科技領袖誇大中國的能力或威脅，部分原因是為了施壓華盛頓，讓政府對中國同行實施關稅和監管限制，並爭取聯邦資金支持。將中國的崛起定義為生死攸關的挑戰，他們就能推動政府向其所在行業注入資金。他們越能引起美國政界人士和公眾的恐慌，就擁有越大的影響力，最終獲得越多權力。

Alexandr Wang, when he was chief executive of the start-up Scale AI, urged President Trump to expand federal A.I. support to match China’s investment “in a new kind of technological arms race.”

初創公司Scale AI前首席執行官汪滔(Alexandr Wang)曾敦促川普總統擴大聯邦政府對人工智慧的支持，以匹配中國在「新型技術軍備競賽」中的投資。。

Jensen Huang, chief executive of Nvidia, has claimed that Chinese chips are only “nanoseconds” behind and that China is not trailing the United States in A.I. Such assessments drew skepticism in both countries, but they reveal how China has become the default benchmark in nearly every frontier field.

英偉達首席執行官黃仁勛稱，中國晶片僅落後「幾納秒」，在人工智慧領域並未落後於美國。這些評估在兩國都引發了質疑，但也反映出中國已成為幾乎所有前沿領域的默認標竿。

Yet Silicon Valley’s China conversation often overlooks contradictions at home. Some of the same leaders urging a U.S. revival also support policies that undermine it: cutting university funding, tightening visa rules for skilled immigrants and waging trade wars that disrupt supply chains with allies like Canada and Mexico.

然而，矽谷關於中國的討論往往忽視了本國的矛盾：一些呼籲美國復興的領袖，同時也在支持著破壞復興的政策——削減大學資金、收緊技術移民簽證規則，以及發動貿易戰破壞與加拿大、墨西哥等盟友的供應鏈。

While the United States debates how to rebuild, China is doubling down on government support of research and development.

在美國還在爭論如何重建之際，中國正加大政府對研發的支持。

But for all its strengths, China’s system carries enormous costs. The same state-driven model that builds record-breaking bridges has left provinces buried in debt. Behind the polished image of A.I. labs and high-speed railways lie stagnant wages and a frayed social safety net.

The world’s tallest bridge, recently completely in Guizhou, stands in one of the country’s most indebted provinces, where rural pensioners live on less than $20 a month. The $1.50 taxi rides that delight American influencers mask a growing class of ride-share drivers: unemployed lawyers, teachers and accountants.

貴州近期竣工的世界最高橋樑坐落於中國債務最重的省份之一，該省農村養老金領取者每月生活費不足150元；讓美國網紅們驚嘆的10元低價計程車服務背後，是日益擴大的網約車司機群體——其中不乏失業的律師、教師和會計師。

That contrast is easy to miss from afar. China’s rise is real, but it’s not boundless. Its achievements coexist with deep structural flaws, just as America’s weaknesses coexist with enduring strengths.

這種反差在遠距離觀察時很容易被忽略。中國的崛起是真實的，但並不是無限度的；其成就與深層次的結構性缺陷並存，正如美國的弱點與其持久的優勢共生一樣。

Silicon Valley’s China envy ultimately says more about America than about China. It reflects a nation grappling with its lost confidence.

矽谷對中國的羨慕，歸根結底更多反映的是美國自身的狀態，折射出這個國家在失去自信後的掙扎。

It’s also worth remembering that the U.S.-China tech rivalry is an ongoing race. In 2018, I began this column with a piece about China’s “Sputnik moment.” Under the weight of American sanctions, the near-death of a tech company had jolted the country into building chips and other technology to reduce dependence on the United States.

When OpenAI released ChatGPT on Nov. 30, 2022, A.I. engineers in China called that day their “ChatGPT moment.” It was, for many Chinese, a time of despair.

2022年11月30日，OpenAI發布ChatGPT時，中國的人工智慧工程師將那一天稱為他們的「ChatGPT時刻」，對許多中國人來說，那是一段絕望的時期。

Two years later, DeepSeek unveiled a cost-effective, high-performing chatbot powered by weaker computer chips. This time, it was called a Sputnik moment for the American A.I. industry, a reminder that the race never ends.

兩年後，DeepSeek推出了一款成本低廉、性能優異的聊天機器人，其運行僅需性能較弱的計算機晶片。這成了美國人工智慧行業的「斯普特尼克時刻」，它提醒著人們：這場競賽永無止境。