President Xi Jinping of China is believed to have ordered his armed forces to be prepared to invade Taiwan by 2027, if necessary, raising the specter of a catastrophic military conflict in the next few years that would almost inevitably draw in the United States.

有分析認為，中國國家主席習近平已下令軍隊做好準備，如有必要在2027年前攻打台灣，這引發人們對未來幾年發生災難性軍事衝突的恐慌，而美國將幾乎不可避免地捲入其中。

But an ongoing purge by Mr. Xi of his top military ranks casts doubt on that deadline and, in the longer term, whether he can trust his generals to successfully wage war.

但習近平對軍方高層的持續清洗行動使人對上述最後期限，以及從長遠來看他是否能信任他的將領們成功發動戰爭產生了懷疑。

Over the past two years, two defense ministers and a host of senior People’s Liberation Army officers have been removed from their positions, including top leaders of the Rocket Force, which controls China’s nuclear weapons.

在過去兩年裡，中國已有兩任國防部長和多名解放軍高級將領被免職，其中包括火箭軍高層領導，火箭軍負責中國的核武器。

Heads continue to roll, including, according to recent reports, one of the highest-profile ousters yet: Gen. He Weidong, the country’s second-ranking officer, who reported directly to Mr. Xi and has been deeply involved in planning for a theoretical Taiwan invasion.

清洗仍在繼續，據最近的報導，迄今為止最引人注目的舉動是拿下何衛東將軍，他是解放軍二號人物，受習近平直接領導，曾深度參與對台作戰預案的制定。

It is impossible to say for sure whether such dismissals are related to corruption — a stubborn and serious problem in the People’s Liberation Army — to ideological differences or to other reasons. But the tumult raises serious questions about the competence and reliability of Mr. Xi’s military commanders. This is likely to weaken his appetite for war, offering Taiwan and the United States time to strengthen their defenses.

目前尚無法確定這些罷免是否與腐敗有關（腐敗是中國人民解放軍的一個嚴重頑疾），或是因為意識型態分歧或其他原因。但高層地震已引起人們對習近平的軍事指揮官的能力和可靠性產生嚴重懷疑。這可能削弱其開戰意願，為台灣和美國帶來強化防禦的時間。

There is no question that China’s military has come a long way. Once antiquated, it is now the world’s largest armed force and rivals the United States in air, naval and missile power. China’s military has been rehearsing an invasion or blockade of Taiwan for years — including exercises in early April — and is working out some of the challenges of transporting tens of thousands of troops across the Taiwan Strait.

毫無疑問，中國軍隊已取得了長足進步。曾經落後的中國軍隊不僅成為全球規模最大的武裝力量，而且在空軍、海軍，以及導彈實力上能與美國匹敵。多年來，中國軍隊一直在進行入侵或封鎖台灣的演習，包括今年4月初的系列軍演，並且正在逐步攻克將成千上萬的兵力運過台灣海峽的挑戰。

But hardware and logistics alone don’t ensure victory. Military effectiveness depends heavily on battlefield leadership — experienced commanders able to make tough calls, quickly, in the fog of war. China has not fought a war since 1979, and today’s generation of Chinese officers, unlike their American and Russian counterparts, has no battlefield experience, a fact that Mr. Xi himself has lamented.

但僅靠硬件裝備和後勤保障不足以確保勝利。軍事上的成功在很大程度上取決於戰場領導力，需要有能力在戰爭迷霧中迅速做出艱難決策的、經驗豐富的指揮官。中國自1979年以來沒有打過仗，與美國和俄羅斯的軍官們不同，中國今天的這代軍官缺乏戰場經驗，這一事實連習近平本人也曾表達遺憾。

The deeper problem — underscored by the internal turmoil — is that Mr. Xi and the Chinese Communist Party may not even have a solid grip on their army.

軍方內部動盪凸顯出來的更深層問題是，習近平和中國共產黨甚至連對軍隊的牢固掌控都缺乏保證。

Unlike the U.S. military, whose personnel swear an oath to the Constitution and are supposed to be apolitical, the People’s Liberation Army is the Chinese Communist Party’s army. Its officers swear allegiance to the party — of which they are members — and take their orders from Mr. Xi as head of the party and chairman of its powerful Central Military Commission. In theory, they should be under firm party control, but that’s not the case.

與美國軍人宣誓效忠憲法並保持政治中立不同，中國人民解放軍是黨的軍隊，軍官都是黨員，他們宣誓效忠中共，聽命於中共總書記和中央軍委主席習近平。理論上，這支軍隊應受黨的絕對領導，但現實情況卻並非如此。

The People’s Liberation Army, with its combined army, navy and air forces, occupies a powerful position in China. This was immortalized by Mao Zedong, who said, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” The army’s status resulted in party leaders granting it a high degree of autonomy to ensure generals remained loyal, essentially allowing it to police itself.

作為陸海空三軍聯合體，中國人民解放軍在國家的政治體系中擁有強大地位。這個不朽的地位由毛澤東「槍杆子裡面出政權」的論斷所奠定。擁有這種地位的結果是，中共領導人為確保將領的忠誠，賦予軍隊高度的自主權，實質上允許軍隊自我監督。

As Chinese military spending soared over the years, so did opportunities for corruption. Party leaders, some of whom were themselves accused of being corrupt, often looked the other way. But after Mr. Xi took power in 2012, he began an anti-graft campaign throughout the party that rooted out corrupt or potentially disloyal senior military officers. He also undertook the largest restructuring of the armed forces since Mao.

隨著中國軍費開支多年來的激增，腐敗的機會也在加大。中共領導層曾常常對腐敗問題睜一眼閉一眼，領導層有些人也曾被指控腐敗。但習近平2012年上台後在全黨範圍內開展了一場反腐敗運動，清洗了腐敗或可能不忠誠的高級軍官。他還對軍隊進行了自毛澤東時代以來最大規模的改組。

The long-running purge indicates he’s still struggling to assert control.

這場曠日持久的清洗行動表明，他仍在竭力鞏固對軍隊的掌控。

Most of the recent dismissals appear related to corruption. But like his predecessors, Mr. Xi needs the military’s backing to maintain his grip on power and can go only so far in attacking its culture of graft. Illustrating the intractability of the problem, those brought down in the past two years have been his own appointees.

近期被免職的將領多數似乎與腐敗有關。但與前任一樣，習近平在維持自己的權力上需要軍隊的支持，因此在打擊軍隊的腐敗文化上不能走得太遠。過去兩年落馬的將領都是習近平本人任命的，這說明了處理腐敗問題的難度。

Corruption undercuts military preparedness in important ways. It can fuel the rise of officers more skilled at receiving kickbacks than at commanding troops and lead to the purchase of subpar equipment. A report released last year by the U.S. Department of Defense suggested that corruption in China’s Rocket Force might have been so severe that some missile silos required repairs.

腐敗從多個重要方面削弱軍隊的戰備能力。腐敗可能讓一些更擅長收受回扣而非更有指揮能力的軍官得到晉陞，還可能導致軍隊採購質量低劣的裝備。美國國防部去年發布的一份報告指出，中國火箭軍的腐敗問題可能已嚴重到部分導彈發射井需要修繕的程度。

Perhaps more important, the wave of dismissals may mean that Mr. Xi cannot fully trust what his military advisers tell him about China’s readiness for war. General He’s case, in particular, raises doubts regarding Taiwan, a self-ruled island that China claims as its own territory. As a former chief of the Eastern Theater Command, General He was responsible for planning a potential invasion of Taiwan until Mr. Xi elevated him in 2022 to vice chairman of the military commission, where he was the Chinese leader’s top adviser on a Taiwan campaign.

更重要的也許是，軍隊中的罷免潮可能意味著習近平無法完全相信他的軍事顧問們對中國備戰水平的評估。尤其是何衛東的罷免已讓人對中國攻台的準備產生疑問，台灣是一個自治的島嶼，中國聲稱對其擁有主權。何衛東曾任東部戰區司令員，負責攻台預案的制定，習近平後來在2022年提拔他擔任中央軍委副主席，讓何衛東成為自己在台灣問題上的高級顧問。

All of this adds to another key problem common in the armies of autocratic countries: political interference. Chinese officers and soldiers spend substantial amounts of time on political indoctrination, including studying Mr. Xi’s speeches. Ever-present political commissars make sure the party’s orders are followed, which can slow down decision making and inhibit individual initiative. In democratic countries, by contrast, officers have more freedom to make their own decisions and learn from their mistakes.

所有這些增加了專制國家軍隊普遍存在的另一個關鍵問題：政治干預。中國軍隊的官兵們把大量時間花在政治思想灌輸上，包括學習習近平的講話。無處不在的政委體系確保黨的命令得到執行，這可能會放慢決策速度，抑制個體的主動性。相比之下，民主國家的軍官有更多自由自行做出決策，並從錯誤中吸取教訓。

None of this means Taipei or Washington can afford to be complacent. China’s huge army would fight if ordered to, even if not fully ready, especially if China perceives Taiwan moving toward outright independence.

所有這些都不意味著台灣或美國政府能掉以輕心。中國龐大的軍隊一旦接到命令，就會去打仗，即使沒有做好充分準備，尤其是如果中國認為台灣正在走向徹底獨立的話。

But Mr. Xi is probably not spoiling for a fight. The disastrous invasion of Ukraine by President Vladimir Putin of Russia showed the world that military might alone does not ensure victory over a smaller foe that is dug in and determined. Win or lose, a war with Taiwan could devastate China’s economy — which already faces slowing growth and hefty U.S. trade tariffs — and a military failure could threaten Mr. Xi’s hold on power.

但習近平可能不想打一場因小失大的戰爭。俄羅斯總統普丁入侵烏克蘭的戰爭帶來的災難性後果已向世界表明，僅靠軍事實力並不能確保戰勝一個堅定防守、絕不放棄的更弱對手。與台灣開戰無論打勝打敗都可能摧毀中國經濟，中國經濟已面臨增長放緩和美國巨額貿易關稅的雙重打擊，軍事上的失敗可能危及習近平的權力。

Taiwan should use this time to radically increase spending on weapons that are especially useful in repelling an invasion, such as anti-ship cruise missiles, sea mines and drones. The United States should deploy more long-range missiles and other weaponry to the region to deter a Chinese attack against the island. It also could capitalize on American military ingenuity by devising innovative ways to thwart an invasion that exploit Chinese commanders’ inexperience and inability to quickly respond to unforeseen situations.

台灣應該用這段時間大幅增加武器投入，尤其是對抵禦入侵有用的裝備，如反艦巡航導彈、水雷、無人機等。美國應該在該地區部署更多的遠程導彈和其他武器，以遏制中國對台灣發動攻擊。美國也能充分發揮美軍的獨創力，利用中國指揮官缺乏經驗、對不可預見情況無法作出快速響應的弱點，想出阻止入侵的創新方法。

The greatest risk today is that the fear and tension stoked by aggressive Chinese behavior and language lead to a miscalculation and war. China’s threats will continue. But leaders in Taiwan and the United States must avoid overreacting and recognize that for the foreseeable future, Mr. Xi will be reluctant to send a scandal-plagued military into battle.

目前最大的風險是，中國咄咄逼人的行為和言論引發的恐懼和緊張局勢可能導致誤判和戰爭。中國的威脅將持續下去。但台灣和美國的領導人必須避免過度反應，並認識到，在可預見的未來，習近平不會輕易把一支受醜聞困擾的軍隊送上戰場。