On May 26, 2023, a U.S. Air Force plane was on a routine reconnaissance mission over the South China Sea when a Chinese fighter jet banked dangerously close to it. Several months earlier over the same waters, a U.S. military plane was forced to take evasive action when a Chinese fighter came within 20 feet.

2023年5月26日，一架美國空軍飛機在南海上空執行例行偵察任務時，一架中國戰機在危險接近處傾斜飛行。幾個月前，在同一海域，一架中國戰鬥機距離一架美國軍用飛機僅約六米，迫使後者採取規避行動。

Risky intercepts and unsafe encounters like these between air and naval forces of China and the United States and its allies have spiked in recent years, and there appears to be no letup. In August, China released footage of what it claimed was a near miss between Chinese and U.S. helicopters in the Taiwan Strait. Territorial confrontations between Chinese and Philippine vessels have become routine in the South China Sea, and this week Australia said a Chinese fighter jet had released flares dangerously close to an Australian Air Force plane.

近年來，中國與美國及其盟友的空軍和海軍力量之間的此類危險攔截和不安全相遇事件激增，而且似乎沒有緩和的跡象。8月，中國發布了一段影片，稱其顯示了中美直升機在台灣海峽險些相撞的畫面。中菲船隻在南海的對峙已成為常態，上週，澳洲稱一架中國戰鬥機在危險接近澳洲空軍飛機的距離釋放了干擾彈。

The danger of one of these incidents tipping into an actual conflict has never been higher. Yet in sharp contrast to the era of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, there are virtually no reliable systems of real-time communication between American and Chinese military forces to defuse an inadvertent crisis.

此類事件升級為實際衝突的風險空前之高。然而，與美蘇對抗時代形成鮮明對比的是，美中軍事力量之間幾乎沒有可靠的實時溝通機制來化解意外危機。

President Trump, who plans to meet President Xi Jinping of China next week on the sidelines of a regional summit in South Korea, has made clear that his priority with China is a trade deal.

川普總統計劃本週在韓國舉行的一次地區峰會間隙與中國國家主席習近平會面，他已明確表示自己的對華優先事項是達成貿易協議。

But trade depends on peace and stability. By working to lay the foundation for durable crisis management systems with China, Mr. Trump can secure his legacy as the president who pulled the two powers back from the brink of World War III.

但貿易依賴於和平與穩定。通過努力為與中國建立持久的危機管理系統奠定基礎，川普可以確保自己成為將兩個大國從第三次世界大戰邊緣拉回來的總統，從而留名青史。

History has shown how superpower confrontation can quickly spiral toward nuclear Armageddon. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis is perhaps the most chilling example.

歷史表明，超級大國之間的對抗可能迅速升級為核災難。1962年的古巴導彈危機或許是最令人膽寒的例子。

The United States and China have also come dangerously close to blows.

美國和中國也曾危險地接近交火邊緣。

In 2001, a U.S. Navy spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet in the South China Sea. The Chinese pilot was killed, and the American aircraft made an emergency landing on China’s Hainan Island, where the crew was captured. The ensuing 10-day standoff was resolved only after delicate diplomacy that reached the highest levels of the Chinese and U.S. governments.

2001年，一架美國海軍偵察機在南海與一架中國戰鬥機相撞。中國飛行員喪生，美國飛機緊急降落在中國的海南島，機組人員被扣押。隨後是長達10天的對峙，直到中美兩國政府最高層進行了微妙的外交斡旋才得以解決。

Whether that kind of crisis resolution can be replicated today is uncertain. China is far more assertive and militarily powerful than it was in 2001, and tensions with the United States are more combustible, amplified by nationalistic pressures on both sides.

此類危機化解模式在當下能否複製，尚不得而知。中國比2001年時更自信，軍事力量也更強大，而且與美國的緊張關係更易激化，雙方的民族主義壓力更是加劇了這種情況。

The situation between the United States and the Soviet Union was different. Although sworn ideological adversaries, they had the wisdom to put reliable checks and balances in place. They notified each other before missile launches, agreed to a range of transparency requirements so that each side could tell that the other’s activities were exercises, not attacks, and followed safety protocols designed to reduce the chance of run-ins. These safeguards remained functional even when tensions spiked.

The importance of open lines of contact cannot be overestimated.

保持暢通的聯絡管道至關重要，其價值不可低估。

In 2015 Russia dramatically increased its military presence in Syria. One of the writers of this essay assisted Ash Carter, then the U.S. secretary of defense, and Joe Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in reopening military communication channels with the Russians that had been severed a year earlier after Russia invaded Crimea. We took measures to avoid accidental clashes in Syria, and no such run-ins occurred.

There has been a modest level of military contact between China and the United States over the years, but nothing that resulted in the dependable safeguard systems that existed with the Soviets. And China has repeatedly severed all military exchange out of anger, most recently in 2022 after the visit to Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi as House speaker.

多年來，中美之間有過一定程度的軍事接觸，但從未有過像美蘇之間那樣可靠的保障體系。而且中國多次因憤怒而切斷所有軍事交流，最近一次是在2022年佩洛西以眾議院議長身份訪問台灣之後。

President Joe Biden and Mr. Xi agreed in 2023 to re-establish military dialogue. But that agreement came late in Mr. Biden’s presidency and has failed to fully take root. Communication remains precarious and insufficient, consisting of occasional phone calls between top government or military officials and other sporadic engagement. This fragile framework cannot be counted on to quickly defuse potential accidents in the air and at sea the way regular, predictable contact can, and it remains vulnerable to rupture in tense times.

拜登總統和習近平主席在2023年同意重新建立軍事對話。但這一協議是在拜登總統任期後期達成的，沒有完全落實。溝通仍然不穩定且不充分，主要是政府或軍方高層之間偶爾的電話以及其他零星的接觸。這種脆弱的框架無法像定期、可預測的接觸那樣，迅速化解海空潛在事故，而且在緊張時期仍然容易破裂。

There have been encouraging recent signs. Last month Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth called the Chinese defense minister, Dong Jun — the Trump administration’s first real step toward correcting this military blind spot. But one-off video calls and predictable measures like setting up hotlines are not enough. During the 2001 crisis, the U.S. ambassador to Beijing, Joe Prueher, was unable to reach senior Chinese military officials at the outset: “They didn’t answer my phone call,” he said. And as the former deputy secretary of state Kurt Campbell has put it, past Chinese reluctance to use hotlines means that American calls have “just rung in an empty room for hours upon hours.”

最近有一些令人鼓舞的跡象。上個月，國防部長海格塞思致電中國國防部長董軍——這是川普政府為糾正這一軍事盲點邁出的實質性一步。但一次性的影片通話和設立熱線等常規措施是不夠的。在2001年的危機中，時任美國駐北京大使喬·普理赫一開始無法聯繫到中國高級軍事官員，「他們不接我的電話，」他說。正如前副國務卿庫爾特·坎貝爾所說，過去，中國不願使用熱線，這意味著美國的電話「只能在空蕩蕩的房間裡響上幾個小時」。

China has hinted at a new readiness to engage. A Chinese military spokesman suggested in late September that Beijing was “open” to pursuing closer military relations with the United States in the name of “greater stability.” In 2017, Mr. Xi himself told General Dunford, the Joint Chiefs chairman, that military ties can act as a stabilizing force in the broader China-U.S. relationship. He was right then, and the point becomes more relevant with each passing day.

中國已暗示有新的接觸意願。一位中國軍方發言人在9月下旬表示，北京「願意」以「高度的穩定性」為名，尋求與美國建立更密切的軍事關係。2017年，習近平主席曾親自告訴參謀長聯席會議主席鄧福德將軍，軍事關係可以在更廣泛的中美關係中起到穩定作用。他的話在當時是對的，而且這一點隨著時間的推移變得越來越重要。

Mr. Trump should build on this momentum by creating a system of routine, sustained, real-time military contact. It could be the difference between war and peace.

川普應該利用這一勢頭，建立一個常態化、持續性、實時性的軍事接觸體系。這可能是戰爭與和平的分水嶺。