While President Trump seemed to threaten military action this month in Greenland over a national security crisis that no one else could see, he has been nonchalant about a far more serious risk of war in the Taiwan Strait — in ways that elevate the peril.

本月，川普總統似乎威脅要在格陵蘭島採取軍事行動，以應對一場只有他一個人能看到的國家安全危機，但他對台灣海峽更嚴重的戰爭風險漠不關心——這種態度反而加劇了危險。

Late last month, China launched missiles around Taiwan in live-fire military exercises that looked like a practice run for a blockade of the island. Major countries, including Britain, Germany and France, promptly called on China to grow up (though a bit more diplomatically). There was one conspicuous absence: the United States.

上月底，中國在台灣周邊舉行實彈演習發射導彈，看起來像是對封鎖該島進行預演。英國、德國、法國等主要國家立即呼籲中國成熟行事（儘管措辭更為委婉）。但有一個國家明顯缺席：美國。

Trump downplayed China’s military exercises. It wasn’t until two days after they had wrapped up that the Trump administration issued a statement — from just a deputy State Department spokesman — expressing concern.

川普對中國的軍事演習輕描淡寫。直到演習結束兩天後，川普政府才做出表態——僅僅是通過一名國務院副發言人發表了一份聲明，以表達關切。

All of which raises a question: If Trump can’t even respond promptly to a straightforward provocation by China, what hope is there that he would respond decisively if President Xi Jinping of China actually attacked Taiwan? And another question: Does Trump’s passivity increase the risk that Xi will take reckless actions toward Taiwan?

這一切引出一個問題：若川普連中國明目張膽的挑釁都無法及時回應，那麼如果習近平主席真對台灣發動攻擊，他又怎能果斷應對？另一個問題是：川普的消極態度是否會增加習近平對台灣採取魯莽行動的風險？

As I wrote in a recent column from Taiwan, of all the calamities that might befall the world in the coming decade or so, a war in the Taiwan Strait would be among the worst. It would risk an exchange of nuclear weapons between the United States and China.

正如我近期在台灣撰寫的專欄所述，在未來十年可能降臨世界的種種災難中，台海戰爭堪稱最惡劣的災難之一。它將使美中兩國陷入核武衝突的風險。

Wars are expensive in every way, while deterrence is a bargain. And while deterrence will depend heavily on Taiwan’s political will, Trump should be doing everything possible to convey to Xi that China would face devastating costs if it attacked Taiwan. Alas, Trump seems to be doing the opposite, signaling to Xi something closer to a yawn.

戰爭無論從哪個方面看都代價高昂，而威懾卻是划算的。儘管威懾力在很大程度上取決於台灣的政治意願，但川普應該竭盡全力向習近平傳達這樣的信息：如果中國攻擊台灣，將面臨毀滅性的代價。可惜，川普似乎在做相反的事情，他向習近平發出的信號更像是在打哈欠。

“That’s up to him, what he’s going to be doing,” Trump said in an interview with The Times this month, referring to how Xi might handle Taiwan. “But, you know, I’ve expressed to him that I would be very unhappy if he did that, and I don’t think he’ll do that. I hope he doesn’t.”

「這取決於他，他要做什麼，」川普本月接受時報採訪時談到習近平可能如何處理台灣問題時說。「但是，你知道，我已經向他表達過，如果他那麼做，我會非常不高興，而且我不認為他會那麼做。我希望他不會這麼做。」

That was a shockingly mild response, and it contrasted with the concern in Trump’s own Defense Department. Adm. Samuel Paparo, head of the Indo-Pacific Command, warned last spring that “Beijing’s aggressive maneuvers around Taiwan are not just exercises — they are dress rehearsals for forced unification.”

這番回應之溫和令人震驚，與川普自己國防部的擔憂形成鮮明對比。印太司令部司令塞繆爾·帕帕羅上將去年春天警告說：「北京在台灣周邊的侵略性演習不僅僅是演習，它們是武力統一的綵排。」

And just last month, the Pentagon issued a major report warning about China’s gains in military power, including cyber, space and nuclear weapons and artificial intelligence, and asserting that “China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027.”

而就在上個月，五角大廈發布了一份重要報告，對中國軍事實力的提升提出警告，包括網路、太空和核武器以及人工智慧領域，並斷言「中國預計在2027年底前具備對台開戰並取勝的能力」。

That may be alarmist. My view is that Xi would much prefer to avoid war. But he is hard to gauge, and Trump’s seeming lack of interest in the topic surely plays into Xi’s calculations of the costs and benefits of aggression against Taiwan.

這或許是危言聳聽。我認為習近平更傾向於避免戰爭。但他難以捉摸，而川普對該議題看似漠不關心的態度無疑會影響習近平對侵台利弊的考量。

Ko Chen-heng, a longtime Taiwan security official who now leads a military think tank in Taipei, told me that Chinese generals are probably sobered by Trump’s decisiveness in attacking Venezuela and by the ease with which American forces foiled Chinese-made radar systems in Venezuela.

長期擔任台灣安全事務官員、目前在台北負責一家軍事智庫的柯承亨向我透露，中國的將軍們可能會因為川普在攻擊委內瑞拉時的果斷，以及美軍在委內瑞拉輕而易舉地挫敗了中國製造的雷達系統而清醒。

But Ko also noted that Trump’s mild reaction to China’s military exercises may encourage China, Russia and North Korea to test America in the Pacific.

但柯承亨同時指出，川普對中國軍事演習的溫和反應可能鼓勵中俄朝三國在太平洋地區對美國進行試探。

If a test is underway, I fear Trump is failing it. And some in Taiwan are nervous that Trump’s desire to make his April summit with Xi a diplomatic triumph will lead him to casually make concessions that damage Taiwan’s security.

倘若這場試探正在進行，我擔心川普正面臨失敗。台灣部分人士憂慮，川普希望把4月與習近平的峰會打造成一場外交勝利，這可能導致他輕率做出損害台灣安全的讓步。

Trump’s puzzling deference to Xi has been on display over the last two months, as Beijing has undertaken a frenzied campaign against Japan. The campaign began after the Japanese prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, indicated that her country might respond militarily if China used force against Taiwan.

在過去的兩個月裡，隨著北京對日本展開瘋狂施壓，川普對習近平令人費解的遵從態度已顯露無遺。這場攻勢始於日本首相高市早苗表示，如果中國對台灣動武，日本可能會做出軍事回應。

“If you stick that filthy neck where it doesn’t belong, it’s going to get sliced off,” a Chinese diplomat publicly warned Japan.

「那顆自己衝上來的骯髒的頭顱，必須毫不猶豫地砍掉，」一位中國外交官公開警告日本。

Any normal president would have called Takaichi to show support. Instead, Trump had a call with Xi and then reportedly advised Japan to pipe down. This felt like a betrayal of an ally essential to deterring Chinese aggression.

任何一位正常的總統都會致電高市早苗以示支持。相反，川普卻與習近平通了電話，隨後據稱建議日本少說點。這讓人感覺像是對一位在遏制中國侵略中至關重要的盟友的背叛。

Why should we care about Taiwan? For starters, it’s now arguably the most democratic place in Asia, and it would be better if it didn’t fall under a rival nation’s oppressive thumb. More broadly, Taiwan manufactures most of the world’s advanced chips, so a war there might trigger a prolonged global depression and deprive the U.S. economy and military of critical inputs. In addition, Taiwan is part of the first island chain that limits China’s ability to project power across the Pacific, so its loss would be an immense setback for American military, political and economic influence.

我們為什麼要關心台灣？首先，台灣現在可以說是亞洲最民主的地方，不要落入敵對國家的高壓統治之下比較好。從更廣泛的意義上講，台灣製造了世界上大部分的先進晶片，因此那裡的戰爭可能會引發長期的全球經濟蕭條，並使美軍和美國經濟喪失關鍵物資供應。此外，台灣是限制中國在太平洋投射力量的第一島鏈的一部分，因此失去台灣將使美國軍事、政治和經濟影響力遭受巨挫。

The United States traditionally has declined to say whether it would defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion. But this policy of “strategic ambiguity” oscillates with the president, and Trump seems much less inclined to protect Taiwan than some of his predecessors.

美國歷來拒絕明確表態若中國入侵台灣是否會出兵防衛。但這種「戰略模糊」政策隨總統更迭而搖擺，川普似乎比某些前任更不願意保護台灣。

To the Trump administration’s credit, in December it announced an $11 billion arms sale to Taiwan, a huge package that will help with deterrence. But overall I fear that Trump has projected a dangerous weakness.

值得肯定的是，川普政府去年12月宣布向台灣出售110億美元武器，這筆巨額軍售將有助於增強台灣的威懾力。但總體而言，我擔心川普展現出危險的軟弱姿態。

One reason for Trump’s diffidence may be his dismissal of Taiwan as a tiny island far less significant than China. Another may be vulnerability: Americans don’t seem to understand how much Xi outmaneuvered Trump in 2025. Trump started a trade war with Beijing, and Xi responded to Trump’s tariffs by restricting exports of rare-earth elements, forcing an American surrender and leaving Trump in effect on a Chinese leash.

川普態度曖昧的原因之一，可能是他認為台灣只是一個遠不如中國重要的小島。另一原因或許是脆弱：美國人似乎並不了解習近平2025年在多大程度上戰勝了川普。川普挑起同北京的貿易戰，習近平則以限制稀土出口反擊關稅，迫使美方投降，使川普實質上被中國牽著走。

In 1996, President Bill Clinton dispatched two aircraft carrier strike groups to support Taiwan during a crisis. But Trump knows that if he made a similar move today, China would most likely cut off rare earths and hobble the American economy.

1996年，柯林頓總統在一場危機期間曾派遣兩支航母打擊群支援台灣。但川普深知，若今日採取類似行動，中國極可能切斷稀土供應，使美國經濟陷入困境。

So instead of America’s deterring China from aggression against Taiwan, Xi may be deterring Trump from defending Taiwan.

因此，與其說是美國嚇阻中國侵略台灣，不如說是習近平嚇阻川普不要出手保衛台灣。

Trump should take two critical steps to boost deterrence. First is to ensure that Russia loses in Ukraine or pays a staggeringly high price. If Xi saw the world united behind strong anti-Russia sanctions and asset confiscations as well as overwhelming support for Ukraine that made Moscow likely to lose, he would hesitate to attack Taiwan.

川普應採取兩個關鍵步驟來增強威懾力。首先是確保俄羅斯在烏克蘭問題上失敗，或付出驚人的高昂代價。如果習近平看到全世界團結一致對俄羅斯實施強有力的反制裁和資產沒收，並對烏克蘭給予壓倒性的支持，使莫斯科很可能輸掉，那麼他就會對攻擊台灣三思而行。

Second, the United States should cultivate friends that would stand with us in a conflict over Taiwan. President Joe Biden knit together Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia for that purpose. It would also help to have friendly countries ready to sanction China and to support a blockade of Chinese shipping through the Malacca Straits.

其次，美國應該培養在台灣衝突中與我們站在一起的朋友。拜登總統為此團結了日本、韓國、菲律賓和澳洲。如果友好國家願意制裁中國並支持封鎖中國通過馬六甲海峽的航運，也會有所幫助。

Trump is taking neither step, of course. And by chasing a fantasy in Greenland and seemingly running away from Taiwan, he elevates the risk of an actual nightmare of a war.

當然，川普並沒有採取任何措施。他沉迷於格陵蘭島的幻想，似乎在台灣問題上退縮逃避，這反而加劇了一場真實戰爭噩夢發生的風險。